In recent weeks, the position of the European Union has become challenging and, in many ways, untenable since the United States seems determined to deny it a place at the negotiating table to settle the Ukraine crisis.

While there are still deep political, economic and cultural ties between the US and the EU, a special consideration of Europe in the US geopolitical thinking is no longer automatically granted. The new US administration's foreign policy seems to have undergone a fundamental shift regarding the EU's future relevance to it.

In addition, a reversed Kissinger strategy is often discussed, which would further weaken Europe. The original Kissinger strategy was to befriend China to counterbalance the Soviet Union; the reversed version would mean to settle the conflict with Russia and focus on the geopolitical struggle with China. In this newly envisaged scenario, the interests of the EU would be far less important to the US than they were before.

This new perception realistically reflects the slow yet steady deterioration of Europe's economic and military positions in the world. According to the International Monetary Fund, the EU's GDP share based on purchasing power parity in the world economy over the past decades has undergone a significant drop — from nearly 28 percent in 1980 to about 14 percent in 2024 — reflecting Europe's declining population and deteriorating competitiveness, something that was highlighted in the Draghi report on the EU's competitiveness in 2024. While the EU's GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity figures of the IMF was fairly close to that of the US in the 1980s, it had become substantially lower in 2024.

European companies are not at the forefront of technological development, either, and there is no significant sector in which European companies have a significant technological advantage over their peers. At the same time, the members of the EU face severe challenges in terms of natural and energy resources, and the Ukraine crisis has presented a significant threat to the continent's access to affordable Russian resources, which have been a key part of Europe's economic model, particularly for Germany, the backbone of the European economy. Choosing US natural gas does not solve the problem. It is neither cheap nor does it reduce Europe's energy dependence.

The military size of the EU members declined from 3.5 million troop members in 1995 to roughly 1.5 million in 2024. According to estimates by Bruegel, a Brussels-based think tank, Europe would need 300,000 more troop members and an annual defense spending increase of at least 250 billion euros ($261.21 billion) in the short term to deter Russian aggression. But it is telling that analysis points out that Europe needs 300,000 additional troop members because of the lack of strong coordination among member states.

The decision-making process at the EU level is influenced by a number of factors. The decisions of the European Commission are often influenced by ideological considerations distorting policies. The influence of ultraliberal and leftist political movements, the negative impact of migration-friendly policies on societal peace, and the effect of failed economic development choices have all come together to make Europe's position no better in a crisis situation when swift action and clear political leadership is needed. The results of German elections make it clear that Europe is turning to more classic conservatism, which is deeply invested in finding the roots of European success in such concepts as nation states, Christianity and traditional values.

When we speak of the economy, the impact of the hasty decisions to prioritize the European economy's environmental sustainability, particularly in the context of the Ukraine crisis and even before that, has been felt by European companies with their declining competitiveness in global markets. While Europe may currently enjoy a period of relative wealth, its geopolitical position remains fragile, relying on US arms for security, foreign technology for its well-being, and the rest of the world for resources.

Therefore, the EU is not in a position to antagonize the big players, but is obliged to cooperate with them. Moreover, the EU would benefit immensely from China if it did not get into a trade war with China, if it opened its doors to Chinese capital, and if it was willing to import and export technology to and from China. What we have to understand is that the EU does not have a clash of geopolitical interests with China, and cooperation with China serves European interests. This is the point at which deeper economic cooperation with China can offer opportunities for the EU.

The author is head of the International Relations School at Mathias Corvinus Collegium, Budapest, and corresponding researcher at the China-CEE Institute. The author contributed this article to China Watch, a think tank powered by China Daily. The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.

Contact the editor at editor@chinawatch.cn.