Aligning China's 'AI+' Initiative with ASEAN's digital vision can help overcome structural challenges in the technology's development and governance

At a time when the world is undergoing a new wave of scientific and technological revolution and industrial transformation, rapid advances in artificial intelligence are reshaping the global political and economic landscape and redefining national development paths and international governance. The ASEAN-China Week 2025 in Fuzhou, Fujian province, on Nov 17, sent out one clear message: Close cooperation between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations is not only an important catalyst for promoting openness and collaboration, but also a major driving force for shared prosperity in the digital future.

The Recommendations of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China for Formulating the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-30) for National Economic and Social Development proposed advancing the "AI+" Initiative to empower the development of new quality productive forces. The goals on innovation and digital transformation laid out in the ASEAN Community Vision 2045 align closely with this imperative plan. Cooperation between China and ASEAN in the field of AI is shifting from simple technology trade to more substantive joint governance, becoming a key practice through which Global South countries can explore their own paths to technological development and governance.

However, achieving the sustainable development of the regional AI ecosystem requires confronting the structural challenges. Research shows that digital development across ASEAN varies significantly: Singapore ranks among global leaders, while Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar remain in the early stages of digital infrastructure building, with persistent shortages in computing power, talent, and stable network coverage. This "multispeed development pattern" results in uneven governance capacity within the region, making it difficult for ASEAN to form unified regulatory concepts, weakening its governance foundation and widening the digital divide. At the same time, ASEAN lacks sufficient collective response mechanisms to counter the risks associated with generative AI — such as deepfakes, algorithmic bias and large-scale data breaches — especially those involving high-risk technologies, making it necessary to build governance resilience through capacity-building and international cooperation.

Further complicating matters is the intensifying competition among major countries over data governance, standards-setting and rule-making. Caught between the "regulation-first" model of Europe and the United States and the geopolitics-driven model of technology competition, ASEAN must explore an AI governance framework that suits its own needs.

Faced with these challenges, ASEAN and China are exploring a new path of cooperation distinct from Western approaches — an innovative practice that combines the systematic strengths of the "China approach" with the flexibility of the "ASEAN Path".

In terms of values, the two sides share strong alignment. China's Global AI Governance Initiative emphasizes national sovereignty, technology for good, opposition to tech hegemony and greater participation of developing countries in setting international rules. ASEAN's governance documents similarly emphasize inclusive development, capacity-building first and multi-stakeholder involvement. This high degree of alignment in core principles — such as putting people first, AI for the common good and an open development orientation — enables both sides to build their cooperation on common ground.

Complementarity is becoming increasingly evident in institutional development. China has accumulated a mature set of regulatory tools in areas such as algorithm filing, platform governance, data security and the regulation of generative AI. These align well with ASEAN's consultative, gradual and flexible "soft governance", facilitating rule coordination and systemic synergy at the regional level. As the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area 3.0 Upgrade Protocol prioritizes the digital economy and institutional opening, issues such as data flows, cross-border services and technical standards are becoming key areas for institutional collaboration.

In technical practice, cooperation has yielded pragmatic and substantial results deeply rooted in industry ecosystems. Chinese tech companies such as Huawei are building cloud-computing centers and enabling smart-city development in Southeast Asia. Alibaba DAMO Academy, a global research program in cutting-edge technology, is working on language models including those that are adapted to Southeast Asian minority languages. Chinese enterprises are helping ASEAN countries build independent and controllable AI infrastructure through open-source technologies, localized solutions, and ecosystem co-building. This model of "affordable, usable and sustainable" technology cooperation not only lowers the threshold for ASEAN to adopt advanced technologies, but also helps the region maintain development sovereignty amid rapid technological change.

As the 15th Five-Year Plan is being unveiled, China-ASEAN cooperation in AI is well-positioned to advance from industrial collaboration to jointly building governance, and from technological integration to institutional integration. This will not only deliver greater digital dividends for both sides but also create a replicable and scalable model for Global South countries exploring paths for technological development and governance.

First, China and ASEAN should promote interconnectivity in "AI+" infrastructure. In line with the CPC Central Committee's call for new types of infrastructure built with appropriate forward planning, China can, under the framework of the Digital Silk Road, work with ASEAN in computing power and data infrastructure, supporting the establishment of regional computing power dispatch networks and interconnected data centers. This will ease the bottlenecks of "high-cost, hard-to-access" computing resources facing SMEs and startups, laying the physical foundation for AI development. ASEAN, for its part, can build sovereign clouds, data centers and green-computing pilot zones to enhance the security and sustainability of its digital infrastructure.

Second, a talent hub for the "Digital South" should be built. Talent is the core of AI development. To address the digital-skills gap faced by ASEAN, China could set up dedicated funds and use existing platforms such as Luban Workshops and the China-ASEAN Technology Transfer Center to pilot an AI skills enhancement program for ASEAN youth. Training should focus on practical skills such as data annotation, model operations and maintenance, and cybersecurity, enabling ASEAN nations to transform their demographic dividends into digital dividends.

Third, the two sides can explore the possibility of establishing a regularized regional dialogue platform on AI governance by creating a China-ASEAN AI governance working group to advance regulatory coordination and standards alignment in cross-border data flows, algorithm transparency, content labeling for generative AI and model safety testing.

Fourth, it is important to deepen cooperation on "small yet beautiful" livelihood applications. The expansion of "AI+" into agriculture, healthcare, education, disaster mitigation and other sectors closely tied to people's well-being should be accelerated. For example, AI can be used to enhance monitoring of pests and diseases affecting tropical crops. Meanwhile, intelligent meteorological models can be applied to strengthen early-warning systems for typhoons and floods. These practical applications would vividly illustrate the essence of building a China-ASEAN community with a shared future.

By closely aligning China's "AI+" Initiative with ASEAN's digital vision, the two sides can not only overcome structural challenges in AI development and governance, but also jointly contribute an "Asian approach" that balances development and security while integrating ethics and innovation — offering the wisdom and solutions of the Global South for global AI governance.

Zheng Xianwu is a professor and the associate dean of the Institute of International Relations at Nanjing University. Wang Yichen is a doctoral candidate at the Institute of International Relations at Nanjing University. The authors contributed this article to China Watch, a think tank powered by China Daily.

The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.

Contact the editor at editor@chinawatch.cn.