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Why does US rev up China threat?
By Michael T. Klare (The Nation)
Updated: 2005-10-08 15:38 This project was well under way when the 9/11 attacks occurred. As noted by
many analysts on the left, 9/11 gave the neoconservatives a green light to
implement their ambitious plans to extend U.S. power around the world. Although
the shift in emphasis from blocking future rivals to fighting terrorism seemed
vital to a large majority of the American people, it troubled those in the
permanent-supremacy crowd who felt that momentum was being lost in the grand
campaign to constrain China. Moreover, antiterrorism places a premium on special
forces and low-tech infantry, rather than on the costly sophisticated fighters
and warships needed for combat against a major military power. For at least some
U.S. strategists, not to mention giant military contractors, then, the "war on
terror" was seen as a distraction that had to be endured until the time was ripe
for a resumption of the anti-Chinese initiatives begun in February 2001. That
moment seems to have arrived.
Why now? Several factors explain the timing of this shift. The first, no
doubt, is public fatigue with the "war on terror" and a growing sense among the
military that the war in Iraq has ground to a stalemate. So long as public
attention is focused on the daily setbacks and loss of life in Iraq — and, since
late August, on the devastation wrought by Hurricane Katrina — support for the
President's military policies will decline. And this, it is feared, could
translate into an allergy to costly military operations altogether, akin to the
dreaded "Vietnam syndrome" of the 1970s and '80s. It is hardly surprising, then,
that senior U.S. officers are talking of plans to reduce U.S. troop strength in
Iraq over the coming year even though President Bush has explicitly ruled out
such a reduction.
At the same time, China's vast economic expansion has finally begun to
translate into improvements in its net military capacity. Although most Chinese
weapons are hopelessly obsolete — derived, in many cases, from Soviet models of
the 1950s and '60s — Beijing has used some of its newfound wealth to purchase
relatively modern arms from Russia, including fighter planes, diesel-electric
submarines and destroyers. China has also been expanding its arsenal of
short-range ballistic missiles, many capable of striking Taiwan and Japan. None
of these systems compare to the most advanced ones in the American arsenal, but
their much-publicized acquisition has provided fresh ammunition to those in
Washington who advocate stepped-up efforts to neutralize Chinese military
capabilities.
Under these circumstances, the possibility of a revved-up military
competition with China looks unusually promising to some in the military
establishment. For one thing, no American lives are at risk in such a drive —
any bloodletting, should it occur, lies safely in the future. For another, there
has been a recent surge in anti-Chinese sentiment in this country, brought about
in part by high gasoline prices (blamed, by many, on newly affluent car-crazy
Chinese consumers), the steady loss of American jobs to low-wage Chinese
industrial zones and the (seemingly) brazen effort by CNOOC to acquire Unocal.
This appears, then, to be an opportune moment for renewing the drive to
constrain China. But the brouhaha over Unocal also reveals something deeper at
work: a growing recognition that the United States and China are now engaged in
a high-stakes competition to gain control of the rest of the world's oil
supplies.
Just a decade ago, in 1994, China accounted for less than 5 percent of the
world's net petroleum consumption and produced virtually all of the oil it
burned. At that time China was number four in the roster of the world's top oil
consumers, after the United States, Japan and Russia, and its daily usage of 3
million barrels represented less than one-fifth of what the United States
consumed on an average day. Since then, however, China has jumped to the
number-two position among the leading consumers (supplanting Japan in 2003), and
its current consumption of about 6 million barrels per day represents
approximately one-third of America's usage. However, domestic oil output in
China has remained relatively flat over this period, so it must now import half
of its total supply. And with China's economy roaring ahead, its need for
imported petroleum is expected to climb much higher in the years to come:
According to the Department of Energy (DOE), Chinese oil consumption is
projected to reach 12 million barrels per day in 2020, of which 9 million
barrels will have to be obtained abroad. With the United States also needing
more imports — as much as 16 million barrels per day in 2020 — the stage is
being set for an intense struggle over access to the world's petroleum supplies.
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